9. The Question of the State: . . . Unless It Is the *Patrie* in Danger!

In the early stages of the syndicalist movement, antimilitarist and antigovernmental activity was regarded as a form of direct action leading to social revolution. International peace was seen as a necessary subordinate to the course of the class revolution. Under the twin terrors of the escalating diplomatic tensions abroad and the increasing use of government force at home, antimilitarist sentiment and activities proliferated. Although the intent of this work is to deal with revolutionary syndicalism from its inception to the war, some comments are in order regarding the movement's seeming about-face with regard to its long-held views on the question of antimilitarism and antistatism. The reader is reminded that these remarks are intended to address the thesis that syndicalism was directed toward practical revolution, and are in no way meant to constitute an in-depth study of anarchosyndicalism and the war. Such a work, which calls for greater insights into the motives of the individuals involved, and a more diligent effort to separate interpretation from interpretation-become-history, requires a larger arena for exposition, and thus lies outside the purview of this examination.

The bulk of criticism made against syndicalism tends to fall within two large categories: that the war was a catalyst revealing an inherent weakness within the workers' movement, and/or that syndicalist leaders betrayed the workers and supported the Government of National Defense to achieve their own personal advantage. As noted in the previous chapter, this study argues to the contrary: syndicalism did not capitulate to expediency or abandon its revolutionary tactic of direct action.(1) Concerns for the security of the movement did not dampen its revolutionary resolve.(2) Nor did the leaders of the CGT "renege on the idea of revolutionary action" with the advent of war.(3) Rather, this study concludes that syndicalists responded to the national crisis in a manner consistent with the movement's definition of revolution and with the means to carry it out.

SYNDICALIST RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

From the inception of the organized labor movement, the CGT had declared itself in favor of international accord. The first few issues of La Voix du Peuple dutifully reported all antiwar demonstrations in England and on the continent.(4) Contributors to the working-class papers insisted that wars were the bourgeois governments' means to extend their control over the people, to command obedience, and to suppress all individual expression. Further, as Constant Martin wrote in Le Libertaire in 1897, war was "the grand aborter of revolution." Evil statesmen manipulated events to bring on war so people's attention would turn "from social questions . . . to bulletins from the battlefield."(5)

Throughout the crisis of the Russo-Japanese War, labor militants charged that the French government was angling to become involved in order to protect French capitalists' investments in Russia on the one hand, and to diffuse working-class militancy at home on the other. In 1904 Raymond Dubéros alerted readers of La Voix du Peuple to the anti-Japanese propaganda campaign being carried on by the bourgeois press. Even songwriters had been enlisted. He cited a then-current satirical song: "The war has begun/ the Japanese maggots/ are going to receive a good spanking." The press was rallying Frenchmen to the aid of their "good friend the Tsar" by telling people that if Russia fell before the yellow peril, there would be nothing to prevent Germans from streaming westward. Workers must not be deceived by this scare talk, Dubéros noted, for what was really in the offing was a capitalist-imperialist war.(6)

The bourgeois-controlled state's true objective was not lost on members of the CGT at their 1904 meeting in Bourges. Pro-Russian propaganda was a sham designed to gain public support for French intervention against the Japanese. Syndicalists were not beguiled. True to his profession, Spirus-Gay of the Union of Lyric Artists offered a lofty pronouncement for the delegates' approval. Even if antimilitarism were not a professional concern, he declared, the congress must assert its "reprobation against war, this ignoble vestige of barbarian epochs, this cowardly and cruel means of servitude of man by man." Delegates opted for a less fanciful statement: they agreed that the proletariat must save "all its energy for the real syndicalist battle" against capitalism.(7)

The Moroccan crisis the following year provoked another wave of antimilitarism. The "Lesson to Remember," according to D. Sieruin, was that most of those patriots now pressing for conflict were really too old and infirm to fight. They would remain comfortably at home. Every time someone shouts "Down with Berlin!" said Sieruin, workers should answer that they would leave for the front if the warmongers marched in the first ranks. That would turn all the national hotheads into pacifists in a hurry. The real cause of the Moroccan

crisis was the bourgeoisie's fear that the workers were shedding their "religious and economic tutelage." No French soldier had fired at a foreigner in thirty-five years, although numerous rounds had been expended against French strikers. The best tactic for workers to adopt, concluded Sieruin, was to remain calm in the face of the bourgeois saber rattlers.(8)

On trial for his antimilitarism in 1905, Hervé asked if the prospect of being swallowed up by the Kaiser was such a horrible fate. French liberties would not end; the "maternal language" would not be snuffed out. Universal suffrage existed in Germany; unions had double the membership of their French counterpart; their public meetings were more numerous; their socialist papers were "more red" than those of the French left's. The Germans could not suppress political liberties--the French were better conspirators than the Germans and would resort to all manner of clandestine activity. As for the language, concluded Hervé, after a century of occupation, the Russians had not been able to erase the Polish language.(9) In other words, the French would remain French even in the face of German domination!

Despite Hervé's blandishments, delegates at Amiens in 1906 were very much concerned about the crisis abroad and at home. In each war between nations or colonies, their resolution stated, "the working class is duped and sacrificed to the class of bourgeois parasites." Workers would not be fooled by cries of saving national honor, knowing that the phrase was invented by financiers to lead the proletariat to massacre. The Algeciras conference and the settlement from that meeting had occurred only because the leaders of all the governments knew that the workers wanted "Peace at Any Price." This, their manifesto, was to serve as a call for "War on War."(10)

The idea that the European proletariat was a potent force for peace was an ongoing theme in the congresses and in the working-class press as the simmering Moroccan crisis gave way to the Balkan explosions. In 1908 A. Luquet called for more vigorous peace demonstrations. The North African crisis was designed to increase the profits of the Krupps and the Schneiders. But capitalists must not be deceived. Workers had the power to change the course of history. Fashoda represented "the rapprochement, the exchange of visits between English and French workers [which had largely] stopped that war between the two countries." French workers must declare their "indissoluble fraternity" with the German proletariat. They must also impress upon those who were searching for an excuse for "fratricidal butchery" to keep in mind that if war could suppress revolution, it might also precipitate revolution.(11)

In a 1908 article in La Guerre Sociale the editors noted that the antimilitarist campaign was reaping a rich harvest. Recent statistics published by the Minister of War documented a rise in incidences of insubordination and desertion in the armed forces between 1904 and 1907

equivalent to three infantry divisions. "Poor France!" the editor clucked. "If this continues, there won't even be a cat to defend your honor and your patrimony of glory and liberty."(12)

In 1912, in the face of the Balkan War crisis abroad and the move to pass the three-year conscription law at home, unionists stepped up their antimilitarist-antipatriotic campaign. The Young Syndicalists of the Seine issued a manifesto charging that it was not the Germans but their own bosses who were the real enemies of the workers.(13) Another article in La Voix du Peuple called on women to work against war by preventing their husbands from leaving for the front. If blood were to be spilled, the writer said, it must be for revolution, not war. "In place of making soldiers," women must "make men."(14)

Direct action included deeds as well as words. Syndicalists believed theirs was the only voice of protest being raised against war and militarism, since it appeared that other leftists were content to give only lip service to the cause of peace. The Second International was impotent: members were too involved in purging anarchists, silencing Hervéists, and being solicitous of Germans. The French party socialists were too preoccupied with achieving détente among the numerous schools and leaders within political socialism.(15) But during the Moroccan crisis of 1905, when socialists remained mute, Griffuelhes went to Berlin to convince Germans to join the French in antiwar demonstrations. The Germans refused.(16) In 1908 the German left was again called upon to make parallel demonstrations with French and English workers. Once more citing the illegality of such actions, the Germans opted instead for the convening of "study sessions" in Berlin. Despite the fact that the CGT had voted at Amiens to stop sending delegates to the Second International because of international socialism's puny stand on militarism, forty-five French unionists traveled to Berlin to coordinate some form of demonstration.(17) In 1910, when the delegates of the Second International agreed to turn over the responsibility of deciding antiwar tactics to a specially created bureau, 20,000 syndicalists turned out at the congress of Toulouse to protest against war.(18) Delegates at the 1912 congress of the CGT at Le Havre called for demonstrations to be carried out in France and Germany. Deeming this "a material impossibility," the Germans again refused.(19)

In the wake of the Agadir crisis in 1911, the syndicalists were able to generate tremendous protest activity by combining the issue of inflation with that of peace. Workers were urged by Jouhaux and Yvetot in an article in La Voix du Peuple "to demonstrate the possibilities of using the general strike to elevate workers' consciousness" on the issues.(20) Conferences were staged in bourses throughout the country during that year, and French union delegates again journeyed to Berlin to demonstrate proletarian solidarity.(21) A special congress

of bourses was convened to confirm once more the use of the general strike to avert war. Delegates agreed to refuse to recognize the state's right "to dispose of the working class."(22) In 1912, when Hervé was chiding the International to muster up at least "a platonic demonstration" supporting peace, over 10,000 workers demonstrated at the special peace congress convened in Paris.(23) Young Syndicalists held their meeting on 1 September 1912 and agreed "to disrupt mobilization."(24) May Day demonstrations revived that year, as Frenchmen protested war and the Three Year Law.(25) On 23 November an enormous peace demonstration was staged at the Aéro-Park in Paris, organized by the unions. It attracted 60,000 people by syndicalist count and 20,000 by police estimates.(26) The unions called for a show of force in December, with a twenty-four-hour general strike. Government repression deflected some of the strike's impact, yet approximately 80,000 French workers, by police estimates, were involved in these demonstrations.(27) In July 1913 delegates met from all over Europe at the Salle Wagram in Paris for another "belle journée internationale" against the outbreak of war.(28)

GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON ANTIMILITARISM

The question to be asked is just how effective syndicalist antimilitary activity was. Jean-Jacques Becker, author of a study on the Carnet B, declares that the workers' movement was in a period of eclipse in the immediate prewar years. He points to the numerous checks on strike activity and the weakening of the Sou du soldat movement as being evidence of this decline. Becker also cites Jacques Julliard's conclusion that the years 1904-1914 witnessed a "cease fire" sentiment on the part of the leaders of the CGT, and a backing away from violent antimilitarist activity.(29) If this is true, it was a reality not shared either by syndicalists or the government. Demonstrations and propaganda increased during those years, as has been noted. Insofar as the French government was concerned, syndicalist antimilitarism appeared to be dangerously successful. The Sûreté Générale expressed concern over the positive response to the Sou du soldat, and was equally impressed with the effectiveness of the Manuel.(30) On the basis of that perceived success, the government prosecuted Yvetot for his part in antimilitarist propaganda.(31) Other forms of harassment were in evidence. In 1906 Yvetot reported that circulation of La Voix du Peuple had dropped from 85,000 to 6,300 subscribers in one year because of the post office's sabotage of the paper. Under government directive, he alleged, the post office either destroyed or held up the paper.(32) Beginning in 1907, there was increasing talk in the Chamber to dissolve the CGT.(33) In 1909 Millerand called for the suppression of political dissenters in the interest of the nation.(34)

The years 1910 to 1914 were years of intense chauvinism in France. The cabinet was extremely nationalistic. Deputies demanded the increase in military strength. Between 1910 and 1912 the doctrine of the offensive and of guerre à outrance was developed within the French general staff. Every crisis abroad was regarded as another skirmish in the war of revenge against Germany. The Balkan wars were seen as another arena for trouncing the Germans. Nationalist sentiment was heightened, with the press gleefully reporting that "it is our cannon that sounded there," and that the Balkans were "the pupils of the French army."(35)

In this climate of ultranationalism, the government was moved to take action against the enemies of the country. The campaign of repression saw the implementation of the Berry-Millerand Act, passed unanimously in 1911, and modified the following year. By its stipulations, soldiers could be consigned to the infamous Batt' d'Afr' in Algeria for antimilitary activity. The law also included prison terms for any civilian who preached insubordination or defamed the military. The latter was defined as anything from insulting the army to carrying out "provocative addresses." The law's supporters received a boost from data released by War Minister Adolphe Messimy, who spoke on the effectiveness of syndicalists' antipatriotic and antimilitaristic activities. In the decade between 1890 and 1900, he noted, desertions had numbered 1,900; insubordinate acts, 4,000. Incidences in these two categories had risen steadily, so that in 1911, 80,000 men were defaulting in some way on their military obligation. The previous year Briand had denounced the "insidious doctors of pacifism." In concurrence with the Berry-Millerand Law and Briand's diatribe against antimilitarism, the government increased its repression. There was a sharp rise in arrests and surveillance of pacifists and union members, and the suppression of antiwar meetings and demonstrations.(36)

The antimilitarist Fédération des Syndicats d'Instituteurs was dissolved in 1912. So too was the Chambre Syndicale de la Maçonnerie de la Pierre, less because of its antimilitarism than from the government's concern for that union's rapid growth and vigorous strike activity, fearing that the increase in antimilitarist propaganda was closely linked with syndicalist strength.(37) In 1913 the Three-Year Law, dubbed by many of its supporters as "the law of national health," was passed, again without opposition from socialist deputies.(38) So too was legislation declaring the bourses off limits to the military. A young recruit was made an example of for reading leftist literature. Protest demonstrations were staged in numerous forts throughout France. Sanctions against these protests created more furor and more repression.(39) On 26 May 1913 there were forced searches of the homes of hundreds of union members carried on throughout France. On 1 July that year the police launched dawn raids on union headquarters, arresting twenty leaders, eighteen of

whom were directors of the CGT. They were tried and sentenced for the crime "of exciting the military to disobedience." Yvetot was given a five-month prison sentence for his participation. On 13 July the CGT was almost dissolved by the government for circulating the Sou to the military.(40)

By the following year, the names of unionists had swelled the roster on the Carnet B. This list, begun in the late nineteenth century as a directive to the police and prefects in France to keep a close eye on foreigners or spies, now contained about 2,500 names, 1,500 of whom were French citizens. Of that number, most were workers, and many were involved in unionism or with the bourses. Evidently, the government feared mobilization would be sabotaged by this unionist fifth column in its midst. These "traitors" were not wild-eyed anarchists, however. Instead, notes Becker, they were generally "workers of rank, well-established in life and in their professional life, having a well-defined family situation, a known domicile, a stable job and profession [and were] men whose links with the world of work were narrow and direct."(41)

Certainly the state's fears seemed to have been born out by union activity during the first half of 1914. Despite their knowledge of the Carnet B and in the face of government repression, in January, 9,000 delegates again met in Paris to demand peace and an end to the Three-Year Law. In March Yvetot was sentenced to one year in prison and fined 100 francs. May Day activity that year increased inordinately, and perhaps helped cow the government. After 1 May, there were no more arrests, even though from January to July, strike activity escalated. The jail sentences handed down for those already convicted, however, totaled 167 months.(42)

SUBMERGED BY EVENTS

In light of this prewar antimilitarist activity, what was syndicalism's response during the July crisis and the war years? The general strike was never implemented to prevent the declaration of war. To understand why, one must document the daily activities of the leftists beginning on 25 July when Austria and Serbia broke diplomatic relations. That day Jouhaux and Dumoulin were in Brussels attending the Congress of Belgian Unions. That afternoon, over a cup of coffee, Jouhaux asked Karl Legien what the German working class would do in case of mobilization. Legien responded simply: "they would march."(43) Feeling uneasy about events, the pair returned to Paris the next day. That day's edition of La Bataille Syndicaliste carried an article written by Jouhaux, expressing accord with Jaurès' antiwar utterances and stating that workers were responsible for peace and must be ready to impose it.(44)

On 27 July the Union des Syndicats de la Seine issued a manifesto calling for the increase in agitation to keep the

governments of Europe from being drawn into the abyss. That day the editors of La Bataille Syndicaliste urged Parisians to demonstrate in front of the offices of Le Matin, a newspaper well-known for its chauvinist stance. The manifesto calling for the demonstration was phrased in the most graphic terms. Readers were reminded of the barbarity of the Balkan wars: women violated, young and old mutilated, the plundering and burning of villages, the cadavers "abandoned to the crows and the wolves. These cadavers will be yours tomorrow!" All must demonstrate, the paper declared. "It is the last hope remaining to us to stop the catastrophe." That night an enormous demonstration occurred in Paris.(45)

On 28 July representatives of the CGT and the Socialist Party agreed to form a Comité d'Action to collaborate on convening a giant meeting slated for the following day at the Salle Wagram. The CGT then issued its own manifesto. Austria carried a heavy responsibility before history, it said, but the responsibility of the other European nations would be no less great if the workers throughout the world did not act to stop the conflict. "The CGT firmly believes that the popular will can stop the frightening cataclysm which will be a European War," it concluded.(46)

That militants were in complete disarray at that moment was indicated by the contents of the 28 July edition of Hervé's La Guerre Sociale. It is a masterpiece of confused signals, connoting not just Hervé's befuddlement, but the confusion of the left as well. Its headline proclaimed, "Down With War!" An article written by Hervé, "Au bord de l'abîme," wondered where "the beautiful dream" of the general strike was. It urged that it would be far better for the French to break the defensive alliance with the Tsar than to risk an offensive war against Austria. In another article, "Governants imbécile," unsigned, but undoubtedly penned by Hervé, the government was taken to task for not allowing demonstrations. But the paper also ran the last installment of Hervé's diatribe against neo-Malthusianism under the title "Les consequences économiques désastreuses de la population."(47)

On 29 July the joint demonstration planned by syndicalists and socialists was forbidden by the government. Crowds converged anyway. That evening syndicalist leaders met in the office of Jaurès' newspaper, L'Humanité, to decide with Socialist Party heads on the proper course of action. Syndicalists wanted to initiate immediate demonstrations, but deferred to the socialists, who urged that the demonstrations be forestalled until 9 August, when the Second International planned to meet in Paris. By waiting, Jaurès affirmed, the acts would take on more of "an international character."(48)

On 30 July Tsar Nicholas II ordered mobilization. The following day the German government proclaimed that the threat of war existed. Back in Paris that day, Jouhaux sent a telegram to Legien at Berlin. The CGT was against the war. Would the international proletariat intervene by

pressuring governments to localize the conflict? Peace remained possible as long as workers organized internationally and opposed the conflagration. Jouhaux further advised Legien that peaceful demonstrations were in the process of being undertaken in France. He called on the German workers also to work against the war. The telegram received no response.(49)

That morning, War Minister Messimy brought in an order for the signature of Malvy, Minister of the Interior, calling for the arrest of those listed on the Carnet B. Malvy suggested that mass arrests during a national crisis would throw the country into disarray. When Messimy left, Malvy telephoned the prefects, urging them to keep close surveillance of those listed on the Carnet B, but only to take individual measures against the anarchists. Malvy's order drew a query from a provincial prefect: how could one tell the difference between anarchists and others? Perplexed by the whole question, Malvy sought guidance from Clemenceau. Later, while under the sentence of banishment for not having implemented the arrests, Malvy wrote that during his interview with Clemenceau, it became apparent that the latter was quite willing to see three thousand workers jailed. "My friend," Clemenceau warned the Interior Minister, "you will be the ultimate criminal if you do not leave my office instantly and sign the arrest order." But Malvy persisted in his cautious attitude. Shortly after midnight, after learning the Confederal Committee of the CGT had agreed not to implement the general strike, Malvy sent another telegram of advice, urging that the authorities have confidence "for political reasons," in all those listed on the Carnet B, and to arrest only foreigners engaged in sabotage.(50)

That same day, 31 July, Jaurès chided the French government for being "the vassal of Russia." Although the state was impotent in the face of the crisis, he declared publicly, the workers would continue to carry out autonomous action to prevent war. Later, while taking coffee at his usual place, Jaurès was killed by a deranged patriot. That night frenzied crowds surged through the streets of Paris. They were shocked by Jaurès' assassination, hysterical at the threat of German invasion, exhilarated over mobilization against an old enemy, and anxious about declaring the general strike and/or the revolution.(51) The headlines in Hervé's La Guerre Sociale, now a daily broadside, screamed "La Patrie en Danger!" If war were to break out, Hervé insisted, it was the fault of the military aristocracy who governed in Clemenceau's name. But as soldiers moved to the frontier to face the Austrian and Prussian military caste, they must be assured that "no one will shoot them in the back." With the militarists purged from the Second International, that group would now become the embodiment of the "Marseillaise" sung by their fathers 120 years ago. "Socialist friends, syndicalist friends, anarchist friends, who are not just the avant-garde, idealists of humanity [Hervé called], who are also the nerve and conscience of the

French army, the patrie is in danger! The Patrie of the Revolution is in danger!"(52)

On 2 August the French government ordered mobilization. The following day the CGT issued its manifesto, signed by the Confederal Committee. If they had not gained all they had hoped, it was because "they had been submerged by events." The CGT deplored the "FAIT ACCOMPLI," the manifesto asserted, but workers must preserve humanity from the horrors of war and remain attached to the cause of syndicalism, "which must transcend and survive the crisis that presents itself." The same day, La Bataille Syndicaliste carried an article praising the government for having "confidence in the French people and particularly the working class," and thanked it for not implementing the Carnet B. That afternoon the Socialist Party leaders met in Paris and agreed that the invasion of neutral Luxembourg compelled the French to go to war. Socialists must fight to defend French culture and freedom.(53)

Meanwhile, the French government acted to create a Comité de Secours National (CSN), naming to this group important representatives from all segments of society: labor, industry, and the church. At the government's invitation, both Jouhaux and Bled agreed to serve. On 4 April the president urged a commitment by all to "holy union." The names of the members of the CSN were printed on beautiful white posters and pasted up all over Paris.(54) That day Jaurès was buried. As the secretary general of the CGT, Jouhaux was called upon to speak at the grave. A special edition of La Voix du Peuple, not in print since the 13 July issue, published the full text of Jouhaux's elegy to Jaurès, which was a mixture of revolutionary exhortation and patriotic élan. He mentioned Jaurès' belief that the workers of all nations had the duty to save humanity. He would have said, had his life not been snuffed out, Jouhaux declared, "you have defended the international cause and that of civilization, of which France is the cradle." Socialists and syndicalists had always sought to generalize those popular rights that the French had so painfully gained. Jaurès had fortified them all in their passionate action for peace. It was not Jaurès' fault or theirs if peace had not triumphed. In the name of those patriots, such as himself, who were leaving for the front, Jouhaux denounced "the savage imperialism that had given rise to this horrible drama." He closed by proclaiming undying faith in the Second International and its resolve to conquer all liberties in order to bestow them on others.(55)

AN ABDICATION OF LEADERSHIP

Throughout the war, the CGT assisted the Government of National Defense by serving with representatives from all sectors on various labor commissions. Syndicalist leaders also participated in interallied conferences in the course of the war. In 1915 and 1916 the CGT leaders, meeting with

representatives from other allied nations, called for construction of a United States of Europe after the hostilities ended, and demanded that workers' clauses be included in the peace treaty. In 1918 the CGT, and particularly Jouhaux, was instrumental in the reconstitution of the Second International with a meeting at Amsterdam. Jouhaux was named vice-president of that organization.(56) These activities provided grist for the mill of opprobrium directed against the CGT leadership starting in the second year of the war.

Commencing on May Day 1915 protestors in the metalworkers' union began their offensive: the war was not a proletarian conflict; workers must abstain from participating in any government action. The Union sacrée was denounced as a "bourgeois trick and a betrayal of unionism." Special rancour was reserved for the CGT's alleged cooperation with the government. In their paper the following year, the metalworkers charged that Jouhaux's participation on mixed commissions constituted class collaboration.(57) By 1917, after the Zimmerwald and Kienthal meetings, the minority had formed itself into a Committee for Syndicalist Defense (CDS). That year saw the proliferation of labor unrest caused by a series of factors: workers' fears of automation; their hatred of war profiteering; concern over the competition for their jobs from women, young men, and foreigners; and a galloping inflation. A manifesto signed by Raymond Péricat for the CDS chided the CGT's leaders for being "valets and lackies of the government." The CGT had done nothing to support May Day, to ease the cost of living, or to counter the allegation that the strikes carried on that year had been paid for by German money, Péricat charged.(58)

Perhaps the most concerted criticism of CGT leadership came from Georges Dumoulin, although his charges underwent considerable modification as he moved from the position of being with the minority to standing with the majority.(59) Dumoulin had been with Jouhaux in Brussels during the July crisis and the meeting with Legien. His position of importance as an editor on La Voix du Peuple and as undersecretary of the CGT, however, had not protected him from being mobilized on 2 August. He was sent to Boulogne-sur-Mer, where he continued to write and receive visits from his militant CGT friends and from other dignitaries, such as Léon Trotsky and Charles Malato. After seeing some action at Verdun, in January 1917, Dumoulin was reassigned to the mines at Roche-la-Molière. During that year he was involved in strike activity with the miners, and he voiced his support of the Zimmerwaldian position. That year also, Dumoulin penned a brochure entitled Les syndicalistes française et la guerre, which placed him squarely in the minority camp.(60)

The actions of the Confederation's leaders during the July crisis, he charged, had been guided by cowardice. Jouhaux had always made much of the meeting with Legien, but Legien's speculation about the German workers was not the

reason Jouhaux and the others had not called for the general strike. They had really feared being sent to a concentration camp if they had. Without any mandate from the CGT, Jouhaux and Griffuelhes had accepted the phony title of "National Commissar" and fled with the Socialist Party leaders to Bordeaux because they feared being taken hostage of the Germans in the event that Paris fell. Fear for their lives, Dumoulin charged, had caused the leaders to act only "by the necessities of the moment." And all their actions had been incorrect. Their first manifesto on the war, charging Austria with responsibility, had only provided the occasion for the French proletariat "to have faith in the occult work of diplomacy." The flight to Bordeaux, Dumoulin said, had constituted an abdication of the leadership's responsibilities. The leaders had not supported the Zimmerwald congress for the revival of internationalism, noted Dumoulin. Instead the Confederation's elite had gone to London to participate in a congress that was only "a war machine." It was in London that Jouhaux, wining and dining with capitalists and reviewing the British fleet, had discovered a new working-class politics that would "deliver the working class to the reigning bourgeois order."(61)

The fault of the Confederation's misdirection, however, did not lie with its leaders, but with the rank and file who were an immoral mass of drunks and hedonists.(62) What could one expect, Dumoulin continued, from "an ignorant proletariat that cannot read, do not want to read, or read only smut." What can be said for militants who prefer "to play cards interminably at the homes of their bistro friends." The Paris bourse was frequented by "drunks" and "high-livers" whose only purpose was to entertain administrators who had adopted the language of the "gros fonctionnaire." Such a degenerate membership could hardly impose a proper attitude on its leadership. Further, the majority in the Confederation had become "a bloc of corruption" composed of "fatalists, tartars," and workers so deeply in debt that they were afraid to risk their material well-being to take a courageous stand.

In such a milieu, any action against the war was impossible. In the prewar years, the antimilitarist propaganda, "more noisy than profound," according to Dumoulin, had tricked them. All had been blinded by syndicalism's success and "the applause at meetings." The leaders had assumed the masses were behind "those who did not wish to be less revolutionary than Yvetot." They had thought it enough to hate the barracks. They had waved their antimilitarist flags as if "to conjure away evil and frighten the bad genies." But the externals had blinded them from the realization that they had not truly instructed the proletariat to hate th state of things to which that class had to submit.

Union sacrée was possible, continued Dumoulin, "Because capitalism [has not been judged] guilty by the masses of exploited." Further, the order for insurrection at the time

of mobilization could never have occurred--not just because of the ignorance of the working class, but because it was organizationally impossible: federal secretaries could not order the bourses to do anything! Now, he noted, the Confederation was reflecting only the materialistic desires of the rank and file and fighting only for bread-and-butter issues. The CGT, Dumoulin noted, had become "a syndicalism of order" with "Taylorist arms and Germanic bellies."(63)

THE MINORITY'S CRITIQUE OF "SOCIAL OPPORTUNISM"

Certainly for many, the CGT leaders' wartime activities constituted a negation of the principles upon which syndicalism stood. Direct action in terms of a military strike never occurred. The leadership's apparent acceptance of the Union sacrée seems to have flown in the face of syndicalism's long-standing position regarding parliamentary participation. The publication of the CGT's minimum program at the end of 1918, with its emphasis on the desire to work for immediate economic reforms, seemed to prove the charge that the movement's leaders had abandoned revolution.(64) When compared with the bolshevik example, French syndicalism appeared to have been coopted by the bourgeoisie insofar as many radicals were concerned. It was not just that the Russian situation provided a stunning example for comparison. A growing amount of criticism heaped on the CGT, as well as the heightened violence within the movement, came from the fact that after 1917, the minority critique of the Confederation tended to be less centered on the CGT's collaboration with the government during the war than on its alleged timidity to support the Russian Revolution.

At the May 1918 meeting of the CGT at Versailles, it was quite apparent that the minority was willing to do violence to anyone who dared criticize Russia. Delegate LeGuennic found that out when he publicly rejected the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and received an inkstand in the face.(65) The minority's resolution at the 1919 Lyon Congress of the CGT stated that the union's leadership had led the workers to war. But worse, it had made of the French proletariat "an international gendarmerie and strangler of liberty" by not vigorously supporting the Russian Revolution and its extension "to all countries, wherein resides the hope of all the martyrized proletarians." The Russian workers had no confidence in those who had created "international federations to betray the interests of the working class." The resolution concluded with a demand that must have been the ultimate insult to the old-guard revolutionaries and advocates of direct action in attendance: the French Socialist Party--the political socialists--it declared, must seek to organize revolutionary elements in place of the CGT and its "social traitors." A few weeks later, demonstrators celebrated the Russian Revolution in a series of events that was punctuated by violence and street brawls.(66)

During 1920 a propaganda offensive was launched by the pro-bolsheviks. That year, and until the spring of 1920, there were waves of strikes in France, carried on almost outside of the CGT's purview.(67) Criticism against the CGT and its leaders reached a crescendo of ill will. In 1919 Henri Guilbeaux called Jouhaux a traitor for having spoken before a banquet of industrialists in 1916, and further charged that socialist and syndicalist bosses had squelched the spontaneous demonstrations carried on following Jaurès' death.(68) Writing a few years later, Edouard Berth, now a supporter of Lenin and the Third International, saw method in Jouhaux's actions: he had joined the government because he nursed a secret wish to become Labor Minister. Jouhaux was "the red prefect of a Bonapartist Republic." Under him, the CGT had become "a kind of social gendarmerie, as the church in the hands of Napoleon had become a sacred gendarmerie." By his support of the Second International rather than the Third, Berth continued, Jouhaux had reentered "the bosom of bourgeois Europe."(69)

The most violent abuse against syndicalism came from the Russian bolsheviks, whose circulars and articles in the western newspapers called for war on the social traitors. Typical of the genre was a letter appearing in a November 1920 issue of the London Daily Herald, signed by the Russian leaders and some of the French minoritaires, reproaching the Second International for being a congress of jaunes who had betrayed the working class. The syndicalists and other leftists who had supported the government had become the "guard dogs of capitalism." Take care, the majority was warned: "you have only a short time to live."(70)

In July 1920 the Third International declared war on independent syndicalism. Although the Socialist Party was not able to stave off schism that year at their Congress of Tours, the CGT was able to avert the crisis, at least temporarily.(71) SFIO General Secretary Ludovich Frossard, recently returned from Moscow, addressed the 1920 Confederal congress at Orléans. He sought support for the minority position within the CGT and called for a fusion of socialists and syndicalists to make the revolution. He also made a stirring defense of Leninism and the Russian Revolution, which if vanquished, would lead "to a night of sinister reaction in the world" and compromise the workers' liberation. His oration, punctuated by great applause, terminated in the singing of the "Internationale" from the delegates of "the Mountain" seated in the upper banques of the conference hall. Frossard's call for unity did not mask the fact that minority leaders intended to effect "a syndicalist renaissance" by throwing out the old leaders and committing unionism unreservedly to the Third International under Moscow's direction. In numerous sessions, carried on in an atmosphere supercharged by catcalls, harangues, and insults, Griffuelhes, Merrheim, and Jouhaux defended their actions and the decisions of the Confederal Committee during and after the war. Their testimonies were so effective that the majority position was subsequently supported.(72)

But the inevitable could only be postponed, not diffused. In 1921 the CGT convened a special congress, again to address the minority's charges. The session opened with scuffles, verbal insults, and gunfire, which wounded several delegates, and closed with a shaky victory by the majority. The resolution determining the issue between the two factions was the one citing the Amiens' Charter disavowing permanent liaisons with any group connected to a political party. Following the meeting, the minority reunited in congress in the same city. Taking a page from the bolshevik's book, they declared themselves the representatives of the proletarian majority, and voted to adopt as their emblem the logo of the CGT.(73)

TRANSPORTED BY EVENTS

The censure by the minority followers of the Third International and the reproach of those who remained with the majority are important in assessing syndicalism's actions during the war and to the schism. Central to this discussion is the fact that these charges have become an integral part of the litany of criticism coloring the perception of syndicalism from its inception to World War I, and as such, must be addressed here. To some, such as Dumoulin, the weak link in the Confederation was its leaders' fears for their own safety. This was the reason the general strike was never called, the revolution was never made, and the war was not averted. Later Dumoulin would write in a gentler vein: "Fear is neither syndicalist, nor socialist, nor any other 'ist. It is human."(74)

But fear seems to have been a fact of life with which most militants dealt on a daily basis. Some of these people had served time in prison for their activities. The rest were acutely aware that their actions could land them in jail. The years immediately preceding the war served to remind them of the government's power. Yet while government persecution increased, so did antimilitarist activities. During the war, regardless of their cooperation with the government, the unions' leaders were never trusted. They continued to be spied upon and followed. The government's attitude was apparent by the fact that in 1917, in an attempt to mask its own ruinous conduct of the war, a scapegoat was found in the person of Malvy, and by extension, of the left in general. Charges of treason were leveled against the wartime Interior Minister for having been sympathetic to workers and for not having prosecuted the pacifists.(75)

Perhaps fear of being thrown into a concentration camp had caused the Confederation's leaders to hesitate in calling a general strike. But there is a valid body of evidence to show that they were aware before mobilization occurred that the government would not implement the Carnet B. Dumoulin later recalled that they had known by the evening of 31 July that they were safe.(76) Jouhaux

confessed in 1918 that he had received word of Malvy's designs by someone in the Interior Ministry before his decision had become public.(77) Malvy himself later wrote that his intention to refuse to sign the order in advance of mobilization had been relayed to representatives of the left.(78)

What of the charge that Jouhaux's speech at Jaurès' funeral had been intended to whip up working-class support of the war? Jouhaux later recalled that he had had no idea of what he was going to say until he arrived at the funeral: he had spoken from emotion rather than from design. Naturally the bourgeois press had emphasized the patriotic rather than the internationalist aspects of his speech, Jouhaux declared. But barring his seeing every editor to explain what he had meant, there was little he could do.(79) Further, since all who had presented eulogies that day were awash in patriotic sentimentality, Jouhaux could scarcely have done otherwise.(80)

Did the Bordeaux flight reveal that the working-class leaders were crass opportunists, wanting nothing more than to be accepted into the bourgeois-capitalist establishment? Jouhaux later defended his evacuation and his short-lived acceptance of the position of National Commissar. In that capacity he was to visit all the provinces under government auspices. Jouhaux perceived this as an opportunity to revive syndicalist spirits, he said. Unionism was in complete disarray: workers had been mobilized; meetings were forbidden by the government during the seige; in the first year of the war, unemployment was astronomical due to the closure of many shops and industries formerly engaged in producing peacetime luxury items. When he realized he would be allowed only to preach the government's propaganda line, he then refused to participate.(81)

If personal desires for safety and security were not the primary motives in the leaders' failure to call the general strike, what was? Simply the demands of practical necessity, based on existing factors: the long-time realization that the Second International was nothing more than a talk shop and an arena for the Germans to show off their organizational power and wealth; the long-held belief that the German left would not or could not take any reciprocal action to prevent war; and the increasing awareness of the depth of patriotic sentiments existing among the French masses. Syndicalist leaders had always known the Second International was impotent: they knew the French party socialists were equally unprepared. With Jaurès' death, no effort was made by that group to declare an insurrectional strike to avert war.

Critics charged that the leaders of the CGT were anti-German and supported the war because they wanted to purge the Second International of the Germans' influence.(82) That may have been true. But more to the point, the German left's commitment to peace and internationalism had always been shaky. Such suspicions were less the result of organizational jealousies than of

history: when the German socialists had been called upon to join the French and/or the British in mutual and concerted demonstrations for peace, they had refused. Based on that experience, there was no reason for Jouhaux or Dumoulin to suspect that Legien was muttering into his coffee cup when he told them the German socialists and unionists would pick up their guns and march to the front. On that basis, for the leaders to have unleashed a general strike in France knowing such actions would not be reciprocated in Germany, at the very moment when German soldiers were on their way to the frontier, would have been insane. They would have been "duped--and defeated," Merrheim reflected. More practical, he recalled at the Lyon congress of the CGT, if the Confederal leaders had declared the general strike, "the working class of Paris . . . would not have waited for the police; they would have shot us on the spot."(83)

In the waning days before mobilization, the depth of French chauvinism had become patently apparent. From its inception, syndicalism had sought to build a transforming paradigm of revolution. But the period of heightened nationalism in the prewar years had either excited a resurgence of patriotism among the masses, or simply cultivated those emotions already there. The Austrian declaration of war on Serbia was met by cheering crowds of French patriots demonstrating in the streets on the night of 26 July, shouting "Hooray for the army, hooray for the war, on to Berlin."(84) When the order of mobilization came, Dumoulin recalled, soldiers gleefully departed for the front in a high state of exhilaration. They were singing patriotic songs, he remembered, shouting nationalist slogans, and leaving their graffiti wherever they stopped: "War on William," "Hooray for German whores."(85) If the Confederation's leaders harbored grudges against the Germans, so too did the French masses.

What of the CGT leaders' collaboration with the wartime government? To have remained aloof would have been impractical. Anarchosyndicalism had always sought improvements for workers as a condition of revolution. The war aggravated the workers' plight and threatened to erase all the gains previously made; thus union protection was even more necessary than it had been before the national crisis. The CGT's representation on the various commissions was a positive benefit to the workers. From that forum the unionists were able to fight against lower wages; they worked to get employment and financial assistance to wives of the mobilized workers; they established soup kitchens, assisted in the relocation of refugees, evacuees, and orphans; and pressured for unemployment relief and dependent allowances. CGT representatives made reports and recommended legislation on a host of matters, from factory safety legislation to demands for government subsidy of staple items.(86) Did this participation mean that the revolutionary syndicalists had been coopted by the government? Jouhaux answered these charges in 1919. What he had done during the war, he insisted, had had nothing to do

with ideology. He had merely been carrying out "a human politics," dedicated not by issues of class struggle or class collaboration, but by "simply human" impulses.(87)

As to their participation on the arbitration boards during the 1917-1918 strikes, Jouhaux asserted that the CGT's presence on the arbitration commissions was not intended to diffuse working-class militancy, but to wrest whatever benefits they could for the strikers.(88) Since union activism always had been designed to force concessions, either on the local or national level--in the workshop or from parliament--such participation remained clearly in the realm of acceptable direct action. The union leadership did not capitulate to passivity during the war. When circumstances dictated, the CGT could, and did, demonstrate its militancy. The May Day 1919 demonstration under CGT auspices was particularly violent, leaving in its wake two dead and 428 wounded.(89)

The issue of the CGT's participation in the interallied congresses rather than in the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences was evidence to many of syndicalism's inherently reformist nature and of the abdication of union leadership. The invitation to participate in a Socialist International Conference to establish international relations and to work toward ending the war was not accepted by either the French Socialist Party or the CGT. The Zimmerwald conference, which drew only enough delegates to fit into four carriages, Trotsky later recalled, was attended by two members of the French minority, Merrheim and Bourderon, neither of whom carried mandates from either the SFIO or the Confederal Committee.(90) Merrheim later remembered, however, that he had spent more time at Zimmerwald arguing with Lenin against the bolshevik's demand that the war be converted into a revolutionary civil war, and that a Third International be formed, than in working toward any viable solution for ending the war. The Merrheim-Bourderon resolution calling for a peace without victory was accepted by the delegates over that presented by the "Zimmerwaldian Left" headed by Lenin.(91)

When a second congress was convened in Kienthal in April 1916, Bourderon and Merrheim again planned to represent the French minority, but were unable to do so when their passports were refused by the government. Although Merrheim remained an adversary of the Union sacrée and a propagandist for Zimmerwaldian principles during the war, he constantly rejected the viability of the Leninist plan to foment revolution in the midst of war. "Even if I had been shot upon my return from Zimmerwald," a martyr to the call for a general strike in the name of peace, he affirmed in 1919, "the masses would not have arisen." They were too weighed down with general preoccupations on the war and by the propaganda fed them by the press.(92) Although on opposite sides of the fence with Merrheim and the minority in the CGT on the issue of collaboration with the government, the majority members of the Confederal Committee, nevertheless, supported by their participation in

the interallied congresses throughout the war the same principles Merrheim and the "Zimmerwaldians of the right" had also accepted: peace without victory, self-determination for all people, and a call to organize a permanent international organization. The fact that they were united in principle is evidenced by the fact that in 1917 and 1918 syndicalist delegates were able to agree on "a resolution of unanimity" which claimed that the principles of Wilson and those of the Russian Revolution were the same as those of the French working class.(93)

In 1922 Jouhaux defended revolutionary syndicalism against the charges of opportunism. Syndicalism, he declared, was not only a doctrine, it was "a movement of realizations," each of which carried the working class further along toward the ideal end.(94) Throughout its history syndicalism had been impelled by three concerns: to advance the cause of democratic revolution by improving the workers' condition, by raising class consciousness, and by surviving as an organization. This goal remained the objective of union leadership during the July crisis and after. What of the means to achieve that goal? For syndicalists, the use of direct action had always been grounded in reality. Its objectives were manifold: either to gain small victories leading to the complete restructuring of society, or to remind the bourgeois government that the latter could no longer carry on domestic or international policies in a vacuum--working men and women, unionized or not, were a powerful force with which to be reckoned. During the war the syndicalist leaders continued to maintain the same posture and make claims on the government when and where it could. The unions protested against profiteering and demanded the government make its war aims public. Jouhaux insisted before a group of parliamentary leftists in 1918 that diplomacy be based "on the wishes of the people and not on the pretensions of some personalities." The hour had come, he said, to give the people its say in public affairs. That day Merrheim ended his speech before the same body with a subtle threat: if the government ignored the workers, they might refuse to fight for that government tomorrow.(95)

In the years before July 1914 the general strike was regarded by syndicalists as a practical instrument with which to threaten the capitalist warlords. The July Days only demonstrated that this weapon was no longer relevant to the needs of the moment. All--bourgeois and proletariat--were indeed overcome by events. By the first of August, with the Germans on the march, the general strike had become a chimera: an aborted general strike declared on the day of mobilization would have rendered syndicalism as enemies of the people; it might have caused the fall of France; and it certainly would have left the working class without an official organ of representation, thereby jeopardizing all the gains made by French labor. Further, the insurrectional strike would not have halted the war; it would not have precipitated the revolution; its only success

might have been in upholding an ideal. But French syndicalism had never been committed to utopian visions or Pyrrhic victories. As the war wearied along, the idea of the general strike became a panacea for those expressing a longing for peace. In the hands of the minoritaires the general strike was fashioned into a weapon to be used against the "reformist" leaders who allegedly had failed to prevent war and initiate the workers' revolution. The bolshevik example of 1917 only seemed to prove the efficacy of the argument of the power of the workers in revolt. But 1914 France was not 1917 Russia. Indeed, Red October would not itself have become a reality without the decisions made during the July Days.

In 1918 Jouhaux noted that at the present moment, syndicalists could not be content "just to throw formulas across space."(96) But revolutionary syndicalism had never been committed to upholding formulas. The general strike, as previously noted, was never regarded as all-inclusive of direct action; it was only a particular form of direct action. With military insurrection deemed impractical, syndicalist leadership seized the moment, as it had always done, to work within the bounds of reality to keep syndicalism alive, to further the workers' well-being, and to press for a future based on international solidarity and the absence of class distinctions. By encouraging and participating in strikes, by collecting data or drawing up guidelines, by recommending legislation, by assisting in the relief of refugees or soldiers' families, by serving on peace commissions, revolutionary syndicalists continued to carry on direct action. And it is essential to note that all their activities were carried out outside the parliamentary arena. As a result of syndicalist action, French labor made its greatest advances--and this during a time of national crisis.(97)

The commitment to direct action was the primary reason for the stance the majority would take on the question of participation in international organizations. Historically, the CGT had been only tacitly supportive of the Second International, largely because syndicalists regarded that organization as merely a forum for politicians and intellectuals. In the hands of the party socialists, the Second International had been a dismal failure in furthering the workers' cause and in advancing international solidarity. But a reconstituted Second International could be a practical revolutionary tool, syndicalists like Jouhaux came to believe, if it could be made to serve as an effective international arena for publicizing, and with luck realizing, proletarian demands. This perception was the basis for supporting the League of Nations. After 1919, when Jouhaux and others of the majority became disillusioned with the League, now "crippled," they believed, by the European allies--and particularly by Clemenceau--they nevertheless remained steadfast to the Wilsonian ideal of general disarmament and of a great society of nations.(98)

The commitment to make this ideal a lasting reality was

the reason for rejecting the Third International, which seemed to the CGT majority to be both superfluous and disruptive of working-class unity. As it became apparent that a third international organization seemed concerned only with preserving bolshevik Russia, many syndicalists became more opposed to its creation. The CGT had been steadfast in its support of the bolshevik revolution and in opposition to the allied intervention and the cordon sanitaire. But the Third International was seen by many in the majority as an instrument of Russian domination; and the French leaders in the CGT simply refused to play Jonah to the Russian whale. Many unionists were angered by the bolshevik's diatribes against them, confused by their acerbic condemnation of both the Amsterdam International and the League, and were repulsed by Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat, which appeared to be nothing more than political totalitarianism in disguise. Other syndicalists were equally offended by what appeared to be Moscow's increasing interference in the internal affairs of French unionism, as witnessed by the Twenty-One Conditions, and horrified at the bolshevik's mandate to reorganize the unions under the direction of the French Communist Party.(99) If the Third International were going to be merely a replay of the Second, with the Russians now assuming the place previously occupied by the Germans, then it seemed to the majority of syndicalists that there was no reason to endure the long train ride to Moscow.

If the idea of direct action as being prescribed by the reality of the moment rendered the tactics of antimilitarism irrelevant in 1914, so too did the changing conceptions of the fatherland make antipatriotism unnecessary. Syndicalism had always been committed to wresting from the bourgeois interests the well-being with which the fatherland was equated. When the Germans mobilized, the patrie was in danger: workers must rally to preserve the gains made against the bourgeois captives that would have been lost before the advancing Teutonic hordes. If much of the left's defense of the fatherland during the war, couched as it was in the romantic phrases of the French Revolution, appears to be evidence of the inherent chauvinism and nationalism of the French worker, one must also keep in mind that the patrie had long remained a symbol of morality and justice whose contents could and would be defined by present realities. To the men of '89, justice was rendered as a regime of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," political in nature. To the syndicalists, the patrie morale had to evolve into a state of economic liberty and equality. Only then, they believed, could the worker control the instruments of production, reap the benefit of his labor, and be truly morally responsible for his own actions. What the experience of 1914-1918 demonstrated was that only when this regime of economic liberty and equality was internationalized could true human solidarity and justice triumph, and a peace based on fraternity and altruism become a permanent reality.

Did the war expose a fatal flaw that had always existed in syndicalism? The conclusion to be drawn from this study is no. The war did not render the movement impotent; revolutionary syndicalism survived not only the war, but the schism as well, albeit in a largely different form from that which it had held during the heroic period of its organizational existence. In fact, war and schism actually strengthened the movement: the CGT's membership base was broadened as larger segments of the working population were encompassed into its folds. The Confederation's organizational structure was revamped so as to guarantee greater input from the provinces and more efficiency and continuity of operation. Such changes were the hallmark of a modern industrial working-class organization.

The French economy had been jerked into the twentieth century by the war. Responding to the new realities, revolutionary syndicalism moved beyond its narrow base of artisanal and anarchist elements to become a more viable representative of the working class. That survival was based on the movement's ability to adapt once more to the imperatives dictated by the necessities of the moment. For syndicalists, the revolution had always been carried on within the context of what was practically possible. Given that tradition, revolutionary syndicalists before and after the war might be faulted for their lack of idealism, but they can never be charged with behaving in a way that was inconsistent with their long-standing preference for practical revolution.

NOTES

1. The claim of Pierre Monatte, critic of the wartime CGT leadership and member of the Communist Party following the schism. Trois scissions syndicales (Paris, 1958), p. 142.

2. Jean Brécot [Gaston Monmousseau] charged the CGT and its leaders with having come under the feudal domination of the government by 1914. La grande grève de mai 1920 et la lutte actuelle des fonctionnaires (Paris, n.d.), p. 1. Henri Barbusse claimed that the organization was too concerned about money and power and had "the soul of the nouveaux riches." La lueur dans l'abîme (Paris, 1920), p. 136. Both Monmousseau and Barbusse were supporters of the Third International.

3. Louis Bouët, Le syndicalisme dans l'enseignement (Saumur, 1924), p. 24.

4. La Voix du Peuple, May Day issue, 16 June 1901.

5. Le Libertaire, 22 Apr. 1897.

6. La Voix du Peuple, 28 Feb. 1904, 6 Mar. 1904.

7. Discussions relating to antimilitarism at the Bourges congress of the CGT in 1904 in L. Gravereaux, Les discussions sur le patriotisme et le militarism dans les congrès socialistes (Paris, 1913), pp. 123-126.

8. La Voix du Peuple, 10 Oct. 1905.

9. Gustave Hervé, Mes crimes, ou onze ans de prison pour délits de presse (Paris, 1912), pp. 72-75.

10. Confédération Générale du Travail, Rapports des comités et des commissions pour l'exercise 1904-06, presentés au XV(e) congrès corporatif, Amiens 8-13 octobre 1906 (Paris, 1906), pp. 10-12.

11. La Voix du Peuple, 2 Aug. 1908. In the same issue the editors protested against "the premeditated massacre" at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges.

12. La Guerre Sociale, 8 Apr. 1908.

13. Comité d'Entente des Jeunesses Syndicalistes de la Seine, La Loi Millerand (Paris, n.d. [1911]).

14. La Voix du Peuple, 16 Dec. 1912. On 19 and 20 May 1917 the women of Saint-Etienne reputedly did stop their men from being mobilized by lying on the railroad tracks. Reported by André Marty in a propaganda piece supporting the pro-Third International position in the CGT. La révolte de la Mer Noire (Paris, 1949), p. 113.

15. Georges Haupt notes that after 1913, following the apparent settlement of the Balkan crisis and because of international socialism's increasing organizational success, the International Socialist Bureau (ISB), the directing arm of the Second International, used antimilitarism not as an antiwar device, but as a common denominator to achieve détente among the fragmented socialist factions within the International. Socialism and the Great War: The Collapse of the Second International (Oxford, 1972), pp. 131-132.

16. Jean-Jacques Becker, Le Carnet B: Les pouvoirs publics et l'antimilitarisme avant la guerre de 1914 (Paris, 1973), p. 51. See Rapports des comitées [Amiens, 1906], p. 11. The Germans said the SPD would be outlawed by the government if the organization called for any such demonstrations.

17. Legien was secretary of the German Labor Confederation. He had suggested that the International was no place to take up the question of military insurrection. At the Amiens congress of the CGT, Pouget reported on this statement, declaring that if those questions were not to be placed before that international body, there was no point in

sending delegates to its meetings. The Delesalle-Pouget resolution to suspend relations with the International secretariat was approved 815 to 106. See Rapports des comités [Amiens, 1906], pp. 7-8; Léon Jouhaux, Le syndicalisme francais contre la guerre (Paris, 1913), p. 50.

18. Gravereaux, Les discussions sur le patriotisme, pp. 108, 209-210. For an estimate of the number of demonstrators at Toulouse see Victor Griffuelhes and Léon Jouhaux, eds., Encyclopédie du mouvement syndicaliste (Paris, 1912), p. 10.

19. XVIII(e) congrès national corporatif . . . Comte rendu des travaux (Le Havre, 1912), pp. 15-16.

20. La Voix du Peuple, 15 Oct. 1911.

21. Brécy, Robert, Le mouvement syndical en France 1871-1921: Essai bibliographique (Paris, 1969), p. 76. Police estimate that 20,000 attended the meeting; Becker, Le Carnet B, p. 53.

22. La Voix du Peuple, 15 Oct. 1911.

23. XVIII(e) congrès [Le Havre, 1912], pp. 13-16

24. La Guerre Sociale, 30 Oct. 1912. See La Voix du Peuple, 1 Dec. 1912 for figures on the number of demonstrators. Between 10,000 and 12,000 Parisian workers demonstrated outside the city hall to protest the trial and sentencing of three directors of the Chambre Syndicale de la Maçonnerie de la Pierre in 1912, according to Becker, Le Carnet B, p. 30.

25. Maurice Dommanget, Histoire du Premier Mai (Paris, 1953), pp. 38-39.

26. La Voix du Peuple, 25 Nov. 1912.

27. Becker, Le Carnet B, p. 57.

28. Dommanget, Histoire du Premier Mai, p. 39.

29. Becker, Le Carnet B, p. 80; citing Julliard on page 16.

30. Ibid., p. 26.

31. Ibid., pp. 41-42, 44.

32. Rapports des comités [Amiens, 1906], p. 65.

33. Sylvain Humbert, Le mouvement syndical (Paris, 1912), p. 69. During this period Briand supported the suppression of the Sou, but not of the unions. Ibid. In

1911 he became more militant, calling for the surveillance of the bourses in order to combat antimilitarism and antipatriotism. Becker, Le Carnet B, p. 83. For a discussion of the Radical Party's disillusionment with unionism see Judith F. Stone, The Search for Social Peace. Reform Legislation in France, 1890-1914 (New York, 1985), p. 166.

34. Becker, Le Carnet B., p. 85. There were always threats to the unions and bourses. Police invaded the Paris bourse on Bastille Day 1901 because there were red flags flying from the windows of the building. La Voix du Peuple, 14 July 1901. Delegate Chareille noted at the Le Havre congress that in 1908, fourteen of his comrades had spent almost one month in prison for singing the "Internationale." XVIII(e) congrès [Le Havre, 1912], p. 35.

35. Georges Michon, La préparation à la guerre. Le Lois de Trois Ans 1910-1914 (Paris, 1935), pp. 96-98; quote on p. 115.

36. Becker, Le Carnet B, pp, 37-38, 176-177. Briand's quote is in Michon, La préparation à la guerre, p. 87.

37. Becker, Le Carnet B, pp. 27-34.

38. Michon, La préparation à la guerre, p. 176.

39. Becker, Le Carnet B., pp. 40-44, 91.

40. Ibid., p. 40.

41. Ibid., pp. 105, 128; quote on p. 178.

42. Ibid., pp. 42-43, 45-46. The existence of the Carnet B was exposed in La Guerre Sociale in a series of articles running in the first part of 1912. See the following issues: 26 Feb. 1912, 13 Mar. 1912. For strike information see Roger Picard, Le mouvement syndical durant la guerre (Paris, 1928), p. 45.

43. Confédération Générale du Travail, La Confédération générale du travail et le mouvement syndical (Paris, 1925), pp. 133-134. Hereafter referred to as La CGT et le mouvement syndical. For coverage of the CGT and the war see the following: Annie Kriegel, Aux origines du communisme français, 1914-1920: Contribution à l'histoire du mouvement ouvrier français, 2 vols. (Paris, 1964); Maurice Labi, La grande division des travailleurs: Première scission de la C.G.T. 1914-1921 (Paris, 1964); Robert Wohl, French Communism in the Making, 1914-1924 (Stanford, 1966). It was no secret among French leftists that the German workers were nationalists first. An article appeared in Le Temps on 9 May 1901 reporting Marcel Sembat's discussion with his German friend Edouard Lockroy, who told Sembat:

> Our socialist workers declare themselves internationalists, but they consider themselves the masters and they regard the socialists of other nations as disciples, or better, as schoolchildren. [Lockroy's emphasis] At bottom, they remain patriots and Germans. If again, once more, Germany--be it to attack or defend--calls [the workers] to the flag, they will be the first to take a gun and make a profession of soldiering.

Reported in Georges Goyau, L'idée de patrie et l'humanitarianism (Paris, 1902), p. 362.

44. Picard, Le mouvement syndical, p. 49. For an account of the socialists' response to the war see L. Gravereaux, Les discussions sur le patriotisme, Haupt, Socialism and the Great War, Jack D. Ellis, The French Socialists and the Problem of Peace, 1904-1914 (Chicago, 1967).

45. Michon, La préparation à la guerre, p. 98. See also La CGT et le mouvement syndical.

46. René Modiano and Alfred Rosmer, Union sacrée 1914-193... (Paris, n.d.), pp. 10-11.

47. La Guerre Sociale, 28 July 1914.

48. La CGT et le mouvement syndical, pp. 134-135; Brécy, Le mouvement syndical en France, p. 84.

49. La CGT et le mouvement syndical, pp. 135-137. This telegram was the object of much confusion and criticism. Picard says it was sent after Jouhaux's return to Paris on 30 July: Le mouvement syndical, pp. 49-50. Bourderon claimed that Jouhaux's emphasis on receiving no word from Legien as the excuse for the Confederal Committee not to call for military insurrection was a flimsy one. The Committee had met until 10:00 PM the night of the thirty-first, he later recalled, so that the telegram could not have been dispatched until the following day. By that time, as everyone knew, the borders were closed and Legien could not have received Jouhaux's appeal, much less responded. See footnote 1 in Brécy, Le mouvement syndical en France, p. 84.

50. Modiano and Rosmer, Union sacrée, pp. 11-13; L.-J. Malvy, Mon crime (Paris, 1921), pp. 35-39. Malvy was not arrested, he was "tried" in the Senate and banished from France on 6 August 1918.

51. Modiano and Rosmer, Union sacrée, p. 11.

52. La Guerre Sociale, 31 July 1914.

53. Quoted in Modiano and Rosmer, Union sacrée, pp. 15-16.

54. Ibid., p. 19.

55. Le droit au bonheur: Jean Jaurès défenseur de la classe ouvrière: estrait de ses oeuvres et notes dactylographiques, discours prononcé à sa mort par Jouhaux, Vaillant (Paris, n. d.). La Voix du Peuple, 4 Aug. 1914. Jouhaux's reference to his mobilization is confusing, since he was never mobilized. He may have believed he would be: he was thirty-five years old at the time. Critics of his actions claim his reference to the call-up was a ploy to identify the CGT with supporting the war.

56. Picard, Le mouvement syndical, pp. 56-62, 155-160, 202. See also Léon Jouhaux, L'organisation internationale du travail (Paris, 1921), p. 9.

57. Picard, Le mouvement syndical, pp. 62, 149.

58. Raymond Péricat, Lettre ouverte: Défense syndicaliste à l'Union des Syndicats de la Seine: Maîtres valets expulsés! (Paris, 1917), pp. 7, 11, 13. For information on the inflation see Yves Merlin, Les conflits collectifs de travail pendant la guerre 1914-1918 (Paris, 1928), pp. 33, 41-51.

59. For a discussion of the reasons for Dumoulin's move from radical to minoritaire to his move back to the majority see the article by Peter M. Arum, "Du syndicalisme révolutionnaire au réformisme: Georges Dumoulin 1903-1923," Le Mouvement Social 87 (April-June 1974): 35-61. Dumoulin's disillusionment with the minority position, according to Arum, was based on the same concerns voiced by others who remained with the majority: his fear that schism would weaken the working-class movement and his revulsion over the bolshevik's tactics of infiltration.

60. Georges Dumoulin in Les syndicalistes français et la guerre (Paris, 1918). Dumoulin continued to remain critical of the CGT's support of the war, but by 1918 he had moved back into the position of majority, again becoming undersecretary of the Confederation that year. At the 1920 Orléans congress, Dumoulin chastised the minority for blindly following Moscow's directives. Reported in Pierre Paraf, Les formes actuelles du syndicalisme en France (Paris, 1923), p. 212. The following year he authored another tract attempting to justify why he had sided with the minority during the war. In this work his criticism was definitely tempered. The CGT had been powerless to lead because it had had to broker all the workers' demands; as a result, its revolutionary potential was nil.

61. Dumoulin, Les syndicalistes français [1918], pp. 14-18. See also Paraf, Les formes actuelles, p. 136.

62. Dumoulin continued to criticize the alleged immorality of the working class and its leaders. In a March 1918 edition of Information Ouvrière et Sociale, the CGT's wartime newspaper, Dumoulin submitted an article on unionism and the war. He said the class was demoralized because of "bad habits, errors, corruptions" that had "stifled the class instinct." This was why they had gone off to war rather than take a moral stand in opposition to the carnage. When he wrote this article he was a member of the CGT majority. Ibid., 24 Mar. 1918.

63. Dumoulin, Les syndicalistes française [1918], pp. 12-15, 21-26.

64. For an exposition of the minimum program of the CGT see Picard, Le mouvement syndical, pp. 187-191.

65. Ibid., p. 160.

66. Paraf, Les formes actuelles, pp. 173-174.

67. The literature on the strikes of 1920 is vast and extremely partisan. The most succinct treatments in English are Wohl, French Communism in the Making, pp. 161-168; and Val R. Lorwin, The French Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 54-55.

68. Henri Guilbeaux, Le mouvement socialiste et syndicaliste français pendant la guerre (Esquisse historique) 1914-1918, preface by N. Lenin (Petrograd, 1919), pp. 6, 25.

69. Edouard Berth, Les derniers aspects du socialisme (Paris, 1923), see pp. 4, 10, 21-22. Berth declared the Versailles Treaty was "the charter of plutocracy," ibid., p. 29.

70. Quoted in Maurice Labi, La grande division, p. 186.

71. For an account of these events see Annie Kriegel, ed., Le congrès de Tours (Decembre 1920). Naissance du parti communiste français (Paris, 1973).

72. Paraf, Les formes actuelles, p. 211. See also L. O. Frossard, Socialisme et syndicalisme (Paris, 1920), which is his speech before the 1920 Orléans congress in separately published form; pp. 22-24 for quotes. It might be noted that the anarchists within the CGT, then aligned with the minority, insisted that Frossard speak to the assemblage. Labi, La grande division, p. 177.

73. Le CGT et le mouvement syndical, pp. 221-226.

74. Dumoulin quoted in Picard, Le mouvement syndical, p. 8.

75. Malvy, Mon crime, p. 83.

76. Dumoulin, Les syndicalistes français, pp. 14-15 of the revised edition of that published in 1918. The reissued version is dated 1921.

77. XIX(e) congrès national corporatif (XIII(e) de la C.G.T.) . . . Compte rendu des travaux [1918], (Paris, 1919), pp. 222-223.

78. Malvy, Mon crime, pp. 38-39.

79. XIV(e) congrès de la C.G.T. (Lyons, 1919), pp. 228-229.

80. See Vaillant's discourse in Le droit au bonheur, p. 8.

81. Jouhaux at XIV(e) congrès [Lyon, 1919], pp. 229-230. Picard notes that the "commissars" never exercised their function under the government directive because such action would have been--and was--suspected by the militants. Later the CGT did organize a propaganda campaign and sent delegates to visit all the departmental unions and many bourses. Picard, Le mouvement syndical, pp. 54-55.

82. Dumoulin, Les syndicalistes français, p. 19 of the 1918 edition.

83. Merrheim reported in Picard, Le mouvement syndical, p. 50. Jouhaux said basically the same thing at the Lyon congress. XIV(e) congrès [Lyon, 1919], p. 222.

84. Modiano and Rosmer, Union sacrée, p. 7.

85. Dumoulin, Les syndicalistes français, 1918 edition, p. 19.

86. Picard, Le mouvement syndical, pp. 55-60.

87. Paraf, Les formes actuelles, p. 176.

88. Jouhaux at the XIX(e) congrès [Paris, 1918], pp. 227-230. Minister of the Interior Malvy often mediated these disputes. Several workers claimed that he was generally impartial in these conflicts, wishing to resolve the problems in the best interest of the nation. His impartiality was a factor in bringing on his five-year banishment from the country. Paraf, Les formes actuelles, p. 154.

89. Dommanget, Histoire du Premier Mai, pp. 66-67.

90. Brécy, Le mouvement syndical en France, p. 91.

91. Labi, La grande division, p. 64.

92. Merrheim at the XIV(e) congrès [Lyon, 1919], p. 173.

93. Merrheim noted that the resolution of the Zimmerwaldian majority called for peace, fraternity, socialism, and peace without victory. He maintained that he continued to uphold these tenets. Ibid., pp. 174-182. See also Pierre Miquel, La paix de Versailles et l'opinion publique française (Paris, 1972), particularly the chapter entitled "L'illusion Wilsonienne de la gauche," beginning on p. 95. For an exposition of the effect of Wilson-Leninist philosophies see Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959).

94. Léon Jouhaux, Réponse à des calomnies: Discours prononcé par Jouhaux à la conférence de Douai, 12 Mar. 1922 (Lille, 1922), p. 20.

95. Confédération Générale du Travail, La leçon des faits (Paris, 1918), p. 7 for quote.

96. XIX(e) congrès [Paris, 1918], p. 221.

97. See Paul Louis, Histoire de la classe ouvrière en France de la Révolution à nos jours (Paris, 1927), pp. 376-377 for workers' legislation passed from 1919 to 1926.

98. See Jouhaux's support of Wilsonianism at the XIX(e) congrès [Paris, 1918], p. 234.

99. Paraf points out that after the war, Moscow was officially represented at every C.G.T. congress. The representatives of the Third International and of the bolshevik line never missed a chance to support the minority position and discredit CGT leaders. This shocked many members, who opposed the work of "these foreign comrades." The Russians were denounced for their "imperialist aims" and their pretentions to interfere with the hegemony of the French proletariat. Les formes actuelles, p. 207. The report given to the delegates to the 1923 Lille congress of the CGT was that the divisiveness existing within the left had been the work of "the men paid by Moscow." The resolution called for workers to do something for the poor Russian population suffering from the barbarity of bolshevism. Confédération Générale du Travail, VII(e) congrès corporatif, tenu à Lille . . . Compte rendu des travaux, (Lille, 1923), pp. 10, 20-21.

PERSONS CITED

Dubéros, Raymond (1881-?), a hairdresser who joined the socialists when he was eighteen. He served as secretary to the Union des Syndicats de la Seine from 1904-1908. He also served one year in prison for signing an antimilitarist tract. He withdrew from union activities after his marriage.

Guilbeaux, Henri Emile (1884-1938), born at Verviers in Belgium of a French father. He was not a syndicalist, although he contributed to anarchist journals. In 1915 he was mobilized, but fled to Geneva.

LeGuennic (?-?), was born in Brittany into a very religious family. He was schooled in the seminary until the age of fifteen. He joined the railroad workers' federation, and attended numerous CGT congresses. He was in rebellion against all forms of authority, and was finally excluded from union membership for not carrying out the wishes of his union's rank and file. He opposed reformism, and was instrumental in bringing the state rail workers into strike in 1910. He was also a secretary in the bourse at Alais (Gard).